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THE PENNEY DECISION AND
REVOLVING CHARGE ACCOUNTS
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. J. C. Penney Co.1 held
that Penney's revolving charge account interest rate of 12' per month
was in violation of the state's usury law. In the past, credit sales had
always been exempt from the usury statute on the basis of the time-
price doctrine. In recent years, however, a few jurisdictions have severe-
ly limited the time-price doctrine and have thus made credit sales sub-
ject to the usury statutes. In following these courts, the Wisconsin court
has left the revolving charge account rate structure in a precarious posi-
tion. Most observers agree that because revolving credit has high operat-
ing costs and a high risk of default, it needs an interest rate structure
higher than the usury rate. The revolving charge account dealer can,
therefore, anticipate a large deficit, unless legislation is passed that is
in tune with present day consumer credit rate structures.
Before considering the Penney decision, a discussion of the history
of credit sales and the applicability of usury statutes to such sales is
appropriate. The characteristics of the revolving charge account and the
merits of this form of credit will also be treated. After considering the
Penney decision and its ramifications, the future of revolving credit in
Wisconsin will be discussed, along with suggestions for appropriate
legislation.
Consumer Credit Under the Usury Statutes
Do not exact interest from your countryman either in money or
in kind, but out of fear of God let him live with you.
2
This quotation from the Old Testament of the Bible is indicative of
man's historic distrust of any charge for the use of money. Civilizations
have always had difficulty regulating extensions of credit. In their early
years, both the Roman and British Empires absolutely forbad any
charge for the use of money. Later, however, they found that unless
they granted lenders some return, they were reluctant to make loans and
a needy borrower was forced to borrow from illegal sources. However,
even when they did invoke statutory regulation of rates, they were faced
with the burden of establishing a reasonable rate.3 Thus, although the
problem has been readily identifiable, proper regulation of lending has
proven a difficult task.
' State v. J. C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
2 For other Biblical recognitions of usury see: Levitias XXV, 35-37; Deuterono-
my XXIII, 19-20; Psalms XV, 5.
3 For more on the history of usury, see Del Sesta, Should Usury Statutes Be
Used to Solve the Installment Problem? 5 B. C. IND. AND CoMm. L. REv. 389
(1964).
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As early as the nineteenth century, the English courts determined
that credit sales not be covered by the dictates of the usury statutes.4
This exception to the usury statutes became known as the "time-price"
doctrine and was rationalized on the following basis. The credit price
was an alternate price that could be chosen by the buyer if he wished to
postpone payment. Thus, the term cash-price was adopted to refer to
immediate payment, while the deferred payment was labeled the time-
price. The courts did not find the difference between the two prices to be
an interest charge,5 but rather identified the difference in price as merely
a fee to account for the added risk of selling on credit. These courts
had little difficulty explaining the reason for this exception to the usury
statutes. The policy behind the usury statutes was to protect the needy
borrower who found himself in a disadvantageous bargaining position.6
Historically, the credit buyer clearly was not in that position since he
could always refuse to purchase the goods or save enough money to
buy the goods at the cash price.
Although this policy distinction has- been accepted by most critics,
the legal basis for the exemption of the credit sale from usury laws has
been difficult to justify. Most courts have held that the credit sale lacks
one of the four essential elements of usury.' Namely, the credit sale is
not a loan or forebearance of money. However, a close analysis of the
definition of "forbearance" reveals that the term can be made to apply
to a credit sale.8 Did not the buyer incur a money debt by his purchase?
Did not the seller-creditor refrain from collecting the money debt for a
specified time? Therefore, the courts could have categorized a credit
sale as a forbearance by the seller to collect the cash-price from the
buyer.
The courts' reasoning would have conformed more to reality had
the time-price differential been recognized as a charge for the use of
money,9 rather than an alternate price that covered the risk of selling on
4As Lord Tenterden stated in the landmark case of Beete v. Bidgood, 7B and
C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K. B. 1827), "The only difficulty (in exempting a
credit sale from the usury statutes) has been occasioned by calling the differ-
ences between these two prices [the cash price and the time-price] interest... "
5 See note 4, supra; This difference between the cash price and the credit price
has been termed the time-price differential.
6 G. M. Accept. Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 77-78, 262 S. W. 425, 428
(1924).
755 AM. JUR. Usury § 12. The elements of usury are stated as (1) a loan
or forebearance, either express or implied, of money, or of something circu-
lating as such; (2) an understanding that the principal is repayable abso-
lutely; (3) the exaction of a greater profit than allowed by law, (4) an in-
tention to violate the law.
8 Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed.) defines forbearance as follows: "Within
usury law, term (forbearance) signifies contractual obligation of lender or
creditor to refrain, during given period of time, from requiring bororower
or debtor to repay loan or debt then due and payable."
9 Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered By Consumer Credit Legislation,
8. B. C. IND. AND Comm. L. REv. 463 (1967). "An economist might argue that
the time-price differential is a charge for the use of the cash price during the
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time. Such logic, however, would have weakened the time-price doctrine
and forced the courts to rely more on the aforementioned policy argu-
ment. It is therefore quite clear that the time-price doctrine was not a
well-carved legal exception to the usury statutes, but rather was a legal
fiction that was predicated on the policy distinctions that separate a loan
from a credit sale. The "time-price doctrine" was only as strong as the
policy that led to its creation. In fact, a jurist who found an individual
credit buyer in a disadvantageous position, could easily avoid the doc-
trine and hold that the charge was within the usury law.
Historically, the courts have adhered to the "time-price doctrine"
rather strictly and have thus continually exempted credit sales from the
usury laws. But with an increase in the use and abuse of consumer
credit'0 several courts viewed the traditional policy distinction between
credit sales and loans with increased skepticism. The argument was that
our once simple society had evolved into a complex mechanical struc-
ture. The credit buyer no longer could refuse to pay the credit price,
since many of the items that were luxuries in the past were now neces-
sities. 1 Consequently, the credit buyer found himself in the same dis-
advantageous bargaining position as the nineteenth century borrower.
No doubt this argument has some merit, but courts seemed to respond
to it on a case-by-case basis. In other words, where the court found
nefarious practices it relied on the credit-need argument for support.
Unethical dealers took advantage of the consumer's ignorance of
finance charges and the buyer's unfamiliarity with other commercial
practices. One such device which was used by the shady vendor was
the holder-in-due-course doctrine.'2 This doctrine enabled the seller to
effectively separate the buyer's right to withhold payment from the
seller's obligation to deliver a merchantable product. The seller could
simply sell the buyer's promissory note to a finance company and re-
fuse to deliver or service the product that was the subject of the note.
The debtor-buyer was left with no defenses against the finance company
and could not afford or was not sophisticated enough to bring an action
against the seller. More frequently, vendors charged exorbitant rates for
buying merchandise on credit because the uneducated buyer was not
equipped to recognize these charges as noncompetitive. It was clear
that as the consumer-credit business grew the abuses also increased.
Although the injustices may have been meager on a per capita basis,
they were substantial enough to elicit widespread calls for reform.
term of the contract and thus the difference between the cash and credit
price is interest."
10 Comment, Retail Installment Sales-History And Development of Regulations,
MARQ. L. REv. 555 (1962).
31 Consumer Credit Synposium. See 55 N.W. L. REv. at 303-04 (1960).
2Although some critics have recently called for the complete abolition of this
doctrine in the name of consumerism it must be noted that this doctrine is
based on strong policy considerations; namely, the smooth transferability of
commercial paper.
1971]
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The call for reform, as is often the case, was misguided at its incep-
tion. Consumer credit as a whole was labeled as unfair to the con-
sumer. The likely vehicle for regulation was the legislature, but prior
to legislation several courts began regulation on a case-by-case basis. 13
These courts did not abrogate the time-price doctrine, but rather found
certain exceptions to the doctrine. The exceptions fell into two general
classes. First, if a finance company was in any way connected with the
credit sale, such as by furnishing forms to the seller,'14 the court held the
transaction an exception to the "time-price doctrine" and thus subject
to the usury laws. Since many credit sellers dealt exclusively with one
finance company, a great number of sellers were likely to have these
forms on hand. Many credit sales were therefore suddenly subject to
the usury laws even though their interest rates were reasonable. Second,
other courts required that before the seller closed the deal, he had to
negotiate with the buyer on the basis of a cash-price and time-price.
Furthermore, in no case was the time-price considered genuine unless
it was arrived at through some means other than afixing a finance charge
to the cash-price.15 Since the time-price in reality had always been cal-
culated by adding a finance charge to the cash price, this was tantamount
to saying that the only genuine time-price is the one that is not a time-
price. In short, although these courts paid lip service to the time-price
doctrine, for all intents and purposes the doctrine no longer existed. 16
In an attempt, therefore, to regulate consumer credit on a case-by-
case approach, these courts were very harsh on the bulk of consumer
credit transactions. Had these courts paid deference to credit transac-
tions as a whole, they still could have relieved the instant aggrieved
buyer on the basis of an unconscionable contract. It is therefore difficult
to understand why these courts chose the usury standard with which
to regulate consumer credit. There was a welter of evidence favoring
other forms of regulation. It was obvious to most observers that if
extension of consumer credit was to be encouraged, a fair return had
Is See notes 14, 15, and 29, infra.
14 Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S. W. 2d 973(1952) ;
15 See Daniel v. First National Bank, 227 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955). This
view produced a startling dichotomy in the finance industry. While these courts
held that a genuine time-price could not be determined by adding a finance
charge to the cash price, other states had passed laws requiring full disclosure
of the finance charge. Thus, for complying with the law in one state, a credit
seller could be held to be in violation of the usury law in another state.
16 Wm. D. Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales,
68 YALE L. J. 849 (1959). See above for summary of what courts have done in
this area; ". . . it appears that the courts which has purported to look through
the form of a credit sale to determine whether it is in substance a loan have
based their findings of usury on factors that are largely unrelated to the poli-
cies underlying usury law. In short, these courts look through form not to
substance but merely to another kind of form."
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to be provided for the creditor. In credit selling, not only are the risks
of non-payment great, but the bookkeeping costs are also very high.'7
The small loan acts were one indication that consumer credit trans-
actions needed a higher rate structure. Small loans are often defaulted
and thus, the risk of non-payment is high. It was recognized at an early
date's that consumer-sized loans would be discouraged unless the lender
could obtain a reasonable rate of interest commensurate with the risk
of non-payment. Nonavailability of small loans left the borrower looking
to illegal sources for his money. The legislatures responded to this
shortage of legal lending with licensing requirements for small loan
agencies.'9 The net effect of the statutes was to allow interest charges
in excess of the usury rates to the licensed agencies. Like the Romans
who found that legal recognition of reasonable rates made it possible for
the borrower to avoid prohibitive interest rates, so too, small loan agen-
cies gave the consumer an opportunity to avoid these exorbitant interest
charges.
Numerous retail installment acts further indicated an appreciation
of the need for special rate structure for consumer sized credit. This
legislation came in response to widespread abuses in installment selling,
particularly in the automobile business. Some jurisdictions only re-
quired full disclosure of the credit terms. Others required full disclo-
sure and actually regulated the rates of interest. The regulatory rate
structures were always liberally drawn in favor of the financer. -0
However, no matter how compelling this evidence may have seemed,
a few courts bypassed the rationale of the small loan acts, the re-
tail installment acts and the "time-price doctrine." Most of these
courts did so while considering only retail installment sales. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court in .J. C. Penney was only the second court to limit
the time-price doctrine as it applied to revolving credit. The Wisconsin
Court, however, treated retail installment credit as if it were inter-
changeable with open-end credit (e.g. revolving charge accounts). There
are some striking differences between the two. In order to analyze the
Penney decision it will be necessary to describe the revolving charge
account and differentiate it from closed-end credit (e.g. retail install-
ment sales).
'2 Kripke, Secured Transactions Financing the Seller, 76 BANING L. J. 185, 191-
192 (1959). "It costs just as much to collect and to do the ledger work on the
installments of a refrigerator contract with payments of eleven dollars a
month as it does to handle a bank loan of $50,000 .. . So the simple fact is
that installment selling cannot be done on the basis of a rate structure derived
from traditional thinking as to usury."
15 The Uniform Small Loan Law was proposed in 1916.
19 These licensing requirements again reflected the long standing notion that only
the "good" lender could charge for the use of money. For Wisconsin Small
Loan Act see Wis. STAT. ch. 214.
20 See note 16, supra at p. 853.
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The Revolving Charge Account
Most full line department stores make this type of credit available
to their customers. The operation of this credit plan may be divided
into three parts. The first is a pre-contractual stage in which the retail-
er explains the terms of the plan and the customer supplies the retailer
with credit references. If both are satisfied, they enter into an agree-
ment.21 The second stage relates to the purchase of merchandise and
the third stage is the billing stage. If a debt exists at the time of the
billing date,22 all purchases are itemized and a bill of the balance due
is sent to the customer. If, however, the customer has paid cash for any
item, has returned an item or has later paid for an item, this item does
not appear on the bill. Furthermore, if the customer pays the balance
due before the next billing date, he avoids all interest charges. How-
ever, if the balance is unpaid at the time of the second billing following
any purchase, a service charge is assessed. The customer then must pay
a specified part of the debt due. There is usually a limit on the amount
of debt a customer may accumulate so that the credit extension is kept
on a consumer-sized level only. Thus, the term open-end credit is some-
what of a misnomer since the credit is open only so long as a maximum
debt is not exceeded.
This credit plan offers advantages to both the customer and the
retailer. The customer has a ready and reliable source of credit for
any unexpected expenses. His payments and record keeping are simpli-
fied because all his debts are combined and paid with one monthly check.
In addition, there is no need for continued re-appraisal of his credit
rating each time he wants to buy on credit. Fewer credit investiga-
tions benefit the retailer also by keeping the operating cost at a lower
level. Moreover, the retailer will probably be rewarded with increased
sales due to the customer's tendency to patronize the store with the
most convenient method of payment.
Although this credit plan, on balance, is a convenience to both buyer
and seller, it has its drawbacks. Consumer protectionists have attacked
the plan on three grounds. It has been claimed that the rate charges are
too high and that they dilute the buyer's real purchasing power.2 3
Further, revolving credit has been said to lead to overcommitment by
the buyer with continued indebtedness and personal bankruptcy being
21 For a typical revolving charge account agreement see 55 N.W. L. REv. at 352
(1960).22 The billing date is established by the retailer, approximately thirty days after
the agreement is signed, and then thirty days after the first billing date is the
subsequent billing date.
23 From The Chicago Daily News, March 25, 1960, p. 3, col. 1, comes some rough
statutory estimates on maximum yearly rates on unpaid balances of consumer
loans: credit unions-12%; commercial banks 12-42%; small loan co., 24-48%;
retail installment financing of a new car over one year, 12-120%; of a used
car, 19-275%. These figures seem to demonstrate that revolving credit is one of
the cheapest forms of credit available to the consumer.
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the ultimate result.2 4 Finally, it is claimed by some that the buyer is
not made fully aware of the terms of the agreement. He may, therefore,
be saddled with credit charges that he knew nothing about.
Sellers complain about the high operating costs of revolving charge
accounts.2 5 The bookkeeping costs and the expense of the initial credit
investigation makes the seller's administrative costs substantial. In ad-
dition, a certain percentage of the accounts are regularly defaulted.
To operate the plan efficiently, therefore, it must be run on a fairly large
volume basis.
The retailer's cardinal goal is to maximize the number of customers
using the plan, while minimizing the revenue lost through default in
payment. Thus, if the plan is reaping a net profit, the retailer will be
more likely to extend credit to marginal credit risks, 'but if the plan is
losing money, only the prime credit risks will be allowed to buy mer-
chandise on credit. It might be argued that since the revolving charge
plan does tend to increase total sales, the retailer would always try to
maximize the number of customers using it. If there was a deficit, he
could pass his loss off to the consumer in the form of an increased
cash price. However, this thesis is weak because it assumes that all
buyers purchase merchandise on credit. If the cash price was raised,
the revolving charge account dealer would lose customers to cash-only
stores since these stores could sell competing items at a lower cash
price. 6
Considering these facts, how will a revolving charge account dealer
react to regulation of his credit charges? Assuming that the regulated
rate is too low, 27 the retailer may eliminate the plan completely, run
the plan at a loss, or alter the plan so that it is once again profitable.
To gain more insight into the effects of a controlled rate structure, let
It is difficult to attribute overcommitment by the purchasing public to revolving
credit only. We live in a system where credit is prevalent and if revolving
credit was eliminated, other forms of credit would be available to the extrava-
gant buyer.
25 Credit costs for J. C. Penney Co. in 1969 amounted to $102 million, including
interest of $44 million to finance customer receivables; provision for bad
debts totaling $16 million, and $12 million to administer customer credit. Since
the company collected only $79 million in revenues this left them with a $23
million deficit for 1969. The Milwaukee Sentinel, February 5, 1971, pt. 2, p. 4,
26 See Warren and Jordan, A Proposed Uniform Code For Consumer Credit,
8 B. C. IND. AND Comma. LAw REv. 451 (1967). As credit selling becomes more
prevalent it becomes easier for the credit seller to allocate his credit costs to
the cash price since he does not have to compete with cash sellers. To the
extent a retailer is forced to pass off credit costs through a higher cash price,
the cash purchaser is in essence paying for the customer who buys on credit.
This is a most unfair and undesirable consequence of a too low rate structure.
27What a low rate is can only be considered as an abstract question. How-
ever, there are two concrete indicators we can look to: (a) the legislatures
that have regulated these accounts have set a figure between 1 and 2% in all
cases. (The most frequent statutory rate has been 1'A%.) (b) the workings of
our free market has led retailers, in the absence of legislation, to arrive at
the 12/7% rate most often.
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us consider a case in point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's enjoining
of the J. C. Penney Company's 1%% per month interest charge.
The Penney Case and Its Ramifications
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. J. C. Penney Co., held
that Penney's revolving charge account was in violation of the state's
usury statute.Y The court reached this result by adopting a very legalis-
tic approach to the subject of usury. The four elements of usury were
stated, and the revolving charge account was found to have all four
elements present. Although prior courts had held that a credit sale was
not a forbearance of money, this court abandoned that viewpoint and
found the plan usurious. Furthermore, they deemed the "time-price
doctrine" not applicable to the revolving charge account because there
was no genuine time price submitted to the buyer. As stated earlier, the
time-price doctrine has not been a well-carved legal exception to the
usury statutes, but only a legal fiction used by the courts to exempt
credit sales from usury statutes.
Conspicuously absent from the court's opinion was an examina-
tion of the merits of the revolving charge account. There was no discus-
sion of the many social and economic problems that presently exist in
the area of consumer credit. There was no mention of whether the de-
termination of a proper rate for revolving credit is a function of the
legislature. In short, it is most difficult to glean from the opinion any
concrete basis for the court's decision. When the court strictly construed
the usury statute it ignored the realities of the outside world.
The court's decision, which took the cue from a few jurisdictions
who had made the same error several years before, disregarded cur-
rent trends in consumer credit. The evidence was clear that if consumer
credit sales were to be encouraged, they needed a separate rate structure.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
after many years of deliberation and preparation, drafted the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), which endorsed the revolving credit
system in the name of convenience to the consumer. Furthermore,
numerous states had enacted statutes creating separate rate structures
for retail-installment credit. Other legislatures had overruled courts
which had made credit sales subject to the usury statutes.29 The Wis-
consin Legislature had passed a bill specifically endorsing the instant
28 48 Wis. 2d 125 at 155.
29 Note the Nebraska experience, McNish v. General Credit Corp. 164 Neb. 526,
83 N.W.2d (1957), in which a court found a bona fide credit sale to be a
device to avoid usury law. In 1959 the Nebraska legislature passed a retail
installment act allowing a greater time price differential than that of the usury
statute. Neb. Rev. Stat. 45-305 (Cum. Supp. 1959). Elder v. Doerr, 122 N.W.2d
528, 535 (Neb. 1963) declared the above statute unconstitutional in light of a
provision in the Nebraska constitution forbidding special laws regulating the
interest on money. The battle ended with an amendment to the Nebraska
constitution permitting a separate structure for credit sales.
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rate structure and credit system that was before the court.30 Neverthe-
less, the court chose to ignore all these facts and found that the credit
rate structure should be subject to the usury statute.
One can only speculate on the reasons for this illogical choice.
3 1 It
seems that in the past decade the mood of the country had a strong turn
in favor of the consumer. This trend toward greater consumer pro-
tection may have been a factor influencing the court's interpretation of
the usury statute. The court's humanitarian concerns for the consumer
may have clouded the more cogent economic and social issues. The Wis-
consin Judicare Society further alerted the court to consumerism with
an amicus curiae brief which stressed social concepts more heavily than
legal concepts. The tenor of their brief portrayed The Penney Company
as a corporate giant who ruthlessly fed on the unsophisticated con-
sumer.3 2 This plea took on an even more appealing tone, in light of the
respondent's (J. C. Penney Company) brief. The respondent's principle
argument was that its charge plan should be exempt from the usury
statute on the basis of the "time-price doctrine." Because this doctrine
has merely been a legal fiction, it was easy for the court to be persuaded
by an emotional appeal. The respondent gave only a cursory treatment
to the need for a separate rate structure in consumer-sized transactions.
Although the Uniform Consumer Credit Code provides compehensive
evidence favoring respondent's 'charge account, it was relegated to a
footnote in the Penney brief. Perhaps the court's decision can be ex-
plained on the basis of superior advocacy and general compassion for
the "underdog." However, we are still faced with the question of what
effect the Penney Case will have on revolving credit.
Wisconsin's revolving charge account dealers immediately complied
with the mandates of the court's injunction and lowered their interest
30 It is most interesting to note that the Wisconsin legislature passed a bill in
1959 that regulated revolving charge accounts at 1'A% per month. The bill never
became law however because it was vetoed by Gov. Nelson (see Wis. Senate
Journal, Veto of Bill 256 S. October 28, 1959). Nelson had no quarrel with the
rate structure in general, but thought that perhaps we should follow other
states, such as New York, who put only 1% charge on a balance of $500 and
over. These declining interest charges on high principal accounts are little
impediment to the retailer. His net return will be high enough to offset his
operating costs. See note 17, supra.
31 The court's interpretation could be rationalized on the basis that the decision
would encourage legislative action in this area. This rationale, however, is
unsound since the court did not even tacitly point to the legislative character
of the problem.
32 These emotional appeals in the name of social reform raise interesting policy
questions. To what extent should these groups, through exaggeration and
emotionalism, be allowed to controvert the real function of the judiciary? For
example, on p. 2 of the Judicare brief, the 1959 Yale Law Journal article by
Warren (see note 16 supra) is cited as authority for abrogating the time-price
doctrine. That same author's viewpoint on consumer credit rate structure
is diametrically opposed to Judicare's ideology. Warren's efforts have been
directed at correcting consumer abuses where they really exist, while tactics
such as Judicare's make great headlines but have a negative effect on the
social welfare.
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rate to 1% per month. Thus, one might reason that the court's decision
will benefit the needy consumer by lowering his interest charge. How-
ever, the workings of our free enterprise system make this view highly
unrealistic. Assuming that the lowered rate will cause a substantial loss
of revenue,3 3 the dealer will seemingly try to recoup his losses. This
goal will likely be achieved through either raising the cash price or
decreasing the risk of non-payment. As has been mentioned before, the
former choice is unlikely due to competition from cash-only stores.34
Thus, the dealer will presumably choose the latter method and extend
credit to fewer but more trustworthy customers. By limiting the exten-
sion of credit the dealer hopes to cut his operating costs by reducing
the number of default payments." But how will this shrinking of
available credit ultimately affect the needy consumer?
First, it must be recognized that persons classified as poor credit
risks, even before the decision, were not allowed to open these revolving
charge accounts. They were simply too great a credit risk. Further-
more, after the decision, the number of consumers who will not be able
to qualify as acceptable credit risks will presumably increase. This group
of ineligible consumers will than be faced with two choices regarding
credit. They can either forego credit purchases altogether, 6 or they can
seek other available sources of credit. Whether the other sources of
credit are legal (e.g. retail installment or small loan agency), or illegal
(e.g. loan sharks), these creditors will demand a much higher fee for
the use of their money than the revolving creditor had charged.3 7 This
consumer will be forced from a convenient, reasonable, and forthright
type of credit to a cumbersome, more expensive, and possibly prohibitive
kind of credit. In short, the court's decision (if allowed to stand) will
lower already reasonable interest fees for wealthier consumers, while
seemingly closing off one of the cheapest sourcs of consumer credit to
poorer consumers. Perhaps the end result of these misplaced efforts,
will be an increase in consumer credit abuses since the rapacious dealer
will be supplied with a larger group of unsophisticated consumers in
search of credit.
33 See note 27, supra.
34 See note 26, supra.
35 In 1969, before Penney's charge was forced to 1% per month, their credit
costs exceeded their service charge revenues by $23 million. Credit costs ac-
cording to Penney's are made up of financing customer receivables, provision
for bad debts and administration costs. Thus, it seems that to cut these credit
costs increased selectivity of credit customers would produce the best result.
36 If this is, in fact, what happens, the decision would have merit. Many critics
of consumer credit have pointed to overcommitment as one of the principle
hardships to the debtor. In practice, however, an individual who is apt to
place himself at a debt level he cannot meet, will do so without regard to the
kind of credit available. For this reason, the second alternative seems more
likely.
37 See 55 N.W. L. REv. at 334, "Revolving credit ... is usually the cheapest
form of consumer credit available to the small borrower."
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In light of these facts, in what way should the legislature respond
to the Penney Case? More specifically, should the legislature regulate
the revolving charge account at a rate other than the usury rate or
should they merely enact permissive legislation that allows the revolving
charge account to function unregulated?
The Future of Revolving Charge Accounts
Before considering the question of what legislation is proper, it is
essential that open-end credit"  be distinguished from dosed-end credit.
The Penney Court frequently cited cases that dealt with closed-end
credit abuses as though they were interchangeable with open-end
credit.39 This failure to categorize open-end credit as a separate entity
made it impossible for the court to consider the merits of revolving
credit. Let us first look at closed-end credit transactions.
The standard installment sales contract is a typical example of a
closed-end transaction. Usually, the seller parts with certain goods in
exchange for the buyer's promise to pay. The promise is ordinarily
made in the form of a note and the debt is most commonly divided into
a specified number of equal payments. These payments are spread over
an agreed period of time. The term closed-end credit is derived from
the limited nature of the credit extended. The seller extends credit only
to the extent of the buyer's indebtedness.
The nature of the closed end credit transaction presents the dishon-
est dealer with many opportunities for abuse. The system itself and the
circumstances surrounding the system place the creditor in a favorable
position.
The closed-end creditor typically handles one product line40 of fairly
high-priced durable goods. Furniture stores and care dealers are typi-
cal examples of businesses that may make closed-end credit available.
Since the closed-end creditor deals in durable items, his customers will
probably be making only an occasional purchase. Therefore, good-will
is not as important a factor for him as it is for the seller of a wide
variety of products.
38 The scope of this paper is limited to the retail store revolving credit plans.
Other forms of open-end credit, such as "Master Charge", have become in-
creasingly popular in recent years. These plans usually consist of smaller
retailers who bind together and pay the credit company a fee for collecting
their customer's debt.39 The Wisconsin Supreme Court cited only one previous case that held revolv-
ing charge accounts subject to the usury statutes. It is interesting to note that
in that case (Sloan v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W. 2d 802
1957) the Arkansas court tacitly absolved the revolving credit dealer from
any wrongdoing, but held the plan to be usurious in an attempt to control
other dishonest dealers (presumably in closed-end credit). See State v. J. C.
Penney Co. 48 Wis. 2d at page 151.
40 Perhaps the most common closed credit dealer is the used car dealer.
Other examples include sellers of snowmobiles, lawnmowers, televisions,
,washing machines, and generally all large appliances.
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Since the closed-end credit transaction is usually financed through
the buyer's promissory note, the seller can discount this note to a finance
company and refuse any demands to repair or deliver the merchandise.
Closed-end creditors deal in high priced goods, thus the principle
amount on which interest is computed will ordinarily be large. Conse-
quently, the dollar-amount paid for credit will be much higher than that
paid for less expensive items. The buyer's ignorance of finance charges
can further encourage the vender to collect exorbitant interest charges.
This all leads to an environment that is most suitable for a rapacious
credit dealer.
To make the setting even more conducive to unethical business prac-
tices, this market has an abundance of uneducated and unsophisticated
consumers. Because this form of credit is more available to low-income
consumers, a greater percentage of these credit buyers will come from
the lower economic class. These credit buyers have difficulty identify-
ing inferior merchandise and many have a tendency to overcommit
themselves when credit is made available. The low-income consumer
is no match for a smooth talking salesman. Consequently, the closed-end
creditor can take advantage of many consumers, not only because the
system favors the creditor, but also because he frequently deals with
indiscriminating buyers.
The characteristics of open-end credit, on the other hand, render
it a convenient method of buying for most consumers. These stores
carry a wide variety of merchandise and depend on continued patron-
age to prosper. Goodwill is clearly a valuable asset and the customer
can expect to be treated with a sense of fairness. As has been men-
tioned, the interest charges are kept at a level that will assure the seller
reasonable operating expense, without allocating too great a burden
on the credit buyer. Since the primary function of this credit is to
increase total sales volume, too high a credit charge would defeat the
purpose of the credit plan. In fact, the average credit charge is kept
quite low due to the relatively small principle and time figures used
to compute interest.41 In addition, separation of the consumer's duty to
pay from his right to performance is not a source of friction in open-end
credit systems. The credit buyer does not issue a note to create the debt
and thus the buyer's obligation can not be transferred to a finance com-
pany. In short, open-end credit does not provide the seller with an oppor-
41 In a study conducted by Prof. Robert W. Johnson, using a leading retailer who
was selected at random, it was found that equating the monthly charge of
1/V% with an 18% per year figure is very misleading. Of the accounts studied,
25.8% of the purchasers paid no interest charge whatsoever and 80.2% of
the purchasers were below the theoretical 18% mark.
In connection with this note the comment of a Penney's executive: "Even
the financially sophisticated" think retailers make a handsome profit on service
charges by charging 11/% per month on revolving charge account balances ...
the formula does not equal 18% a year because of payment options which
charge customers have each month...."
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tunity to take advantage of the consumer. On the contrary, since open-
end credit is extended to only the better credit risks, the consumer is
more likely to be on equal footing with the seller.
It is therefore predictable that both courts and legislatures have ad-
dressed themselves to the problems of closed-end credit more frequently
than open-end credit. Nevertheless, in light of the increased use of open-
end credit, more legislatures have enacted laws directed to this area of
credit. Most of the statutes deal with standardized disclosure of terms
and regulation of the rate of interest.42
Let us next consider what the appropriate response of the Wiscon-
sin Legislature -should be in view of the Penney decision. Focusing on
disclosure requirements, it must be recognized that disclosure serves
two separate functions. The first is to compel the seller to adequately
inform the buyer in advance about the terms of the credit agreement.
This should show how the credit charges will be computed, a statement
of previous balances, amounts debited and credited, the current balance,
and the amount presently payable.43 Although it appears that most re-
volving creditors already meet these requirements, the legislature ought
to make disclosure of these items mandatory. Awareness on the part of
the consumer is essential if he is to choose the credit plan that best suits
his needs.
The second function of disclosure is to provide the consumer with
a time-rate charge in order that he may compare one seller's cost of
credit with another's. 5 This time-rate charge should be expressed in
the same manner by all credit sellers so that the consumer can easily
select the most competitive credit charge. It must be noted, however,
that disclosure of a time-rate is not possible in open-end credit agree-
ments. This is so because a time-rate cannot be computed when either
the time of outstanding indebtedness or the total credit extended is un-
determinable. For example, a buyer who purchases an item one day
after the billing date and pays for the item twenty-nine days after his
42 Note Maleson, Consumer Credit Regulation 23 Aim. L. Rxv. 312 for a discus-
sion of the New York law dealing with open-end credit.
43 In brief form, these are the items that are required to be disclosed under the
UCcc.44 This concept of full disclosure, generally, is the theme of the UCCC. It is
thought that with full disclosure of terms and a vigorous competition, consum-
ers can determine for themselves the most convenient and the best forms of
credit. For this to occur, however, the credit market must not be bogged
down with technical licensing requirements. A vigorous competition relies on
an easy entry into the market. Furthermore, the consumer must be educated
and encouraged to familiarize himself with the terms of the many forms of
of available credit.
45 This cost of credit disclosure is related to the first function in that theoreti-
cally both should aid the consumer in shopping for the best credit package.
However, cost of credit seems to be more directly related to competition
while the disclosure of terms functions more as a method of making the buyer
aware of the bargain he will enter into. In light of consumer apathy to con-
tract terms and finance charges, both functions of disclosure may be purely
academic questions.
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subsequent bill, will pay no interest. Another buyer with a shorter
period of indebtedness may pay an eighteen per-cent interest charge
or higher. Because of these variables, it appears that disclosure of a
time-rate in revolving credit would serve only to mislead the consum-
er,46 rather than inform him. However, once a charge for credit is cer-
tain, the dollar amount the buyer will pay should be stated in his
monthly bill. Further, the rate of interest used to compute the credit
charge should always be disclosed in the original agreement.
Turning to the question of regulation of revolving charge account
rates, it is important to consider whether the rates are currently oppres-
sive or whether they have a potential for abuse if left unregulated. If
we conclude that control of rates is desirable, it will still be necessary to
examine what impact regulation will have on the whole of consumer
credit. In other words, even if legislation is necessary from a theoretical
standpoint, legislation should be enacted only if the benefit derived from
control of rates outweighs the harm done to the total credit picture.
It is a formidable task to determine what an oppressive credit charge
is. It is somewhat akin to establishing what the poverty income level is
in the United States. It seems, however, that when one envisions an
oppressed consumer, one gets the picture of a buyer who has been taken
advantage of, either due to his ignorance or his inferior bargaining
position. just like the needy borrower who came before him, the credit
buyer can find himself in a position where he needs to purchase certain
items4 7 to function as a viable unit in society The question then is
whether the revolving charge account buyer is in this disadvantageous
bargaining position?
As previously stated, the revolving charge account, for the most
part, is not made available to high credit risks. It is therefore most
difficult to picture a revolving-credit buyer in an unfair bargaining posi-
tion. He can always refuse to purchase if the interest charge is too high.
But assuming, arguendo, that the buyer is needy it does not follow that
he is subservient to the seller for all credit purchases. If the item to be
purchased is a necessity he may have no choice but to pay the interest
rate demanded. However, if the merchandise can be classified as less
than a necessity, the needy buyer can always refuse to purchase the
item if he finds the interest rate too high. Many items sold under the
revolving charge plan are not needed to function in our society. This
46 See note 41, supra.
47 This is precisely the point where many of the critics of our present day system
of credit have failed to be discriminating. They reason that since our society
has become highly mechanized, articles that were luxuries in the past are now
necessities. It therefore follows that credit charges must be kept at a mini-
mum by government in order to give the needy credit buyer these necessities
at the lowest cost. But have all items sold on credit become necessities? It is
difficult to understand why credit charges on an item such as a snowmobile
should be controlled given this rationale.
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is even more true of the higher-priced merchandise. The interest charge
on this expensive purchase is the most significant since the dollar-
amount paid for credit is highest in these cases. The rates are further
kept at a reasonable level by a working competition for the buyer's con-
tinued patronage. It must be remembered that the cardinal aim of the
credit plan is to maximize sales. A non-competitive credit charge would
be self-defeating, since it would decrease total sales. In brief, the re-
volving-creditor's interest charges are kept at a reasonable level by two
intermingled forces, the prerogative of the credit-buyer to refuse to pur-
chase most items and the seller's struggle on the competitive level to
maximize his sales. It is, therefore, clear that in most circumstances,
the revolving credit buyer does not find himself in this disadvantageous
bargaining position.
.In light of these facts, legislative control of open-end credit rates
would not seem to be indicated. Assuming, however, that a need for
such regulation was demonstrated,48 the question then is whether this
policy would ultimately benefit the people of the State.
There is no question that the selection of the ideal credit rate is a
delicate task. Since the 1%% per month rate is currently the most
popular, both with legislatures and the free market, one might look to
this level as an ideal standard.Y9 However, even if this is the optimum
rate today, an inflationary economy can render the choice inappropriate
in the future. Our free enterprise system is too dynamic and it gives
the seller too much mobility to allow an administered rate to function
efficiently. If the legislature chooses a rate that is below the market
level what will be the ultimate effect? As stated previously a low interest
rate will either cause the seller to limit his credit accounts, (driving the
ousted consumers to more expensive kinds of credit), or to pass off
credit charge to his cash customers in the form of a higher cash price.
In either case legislation designed to benefit the consumer will ultimately
have a deleterious effect on the consumer. Given this hypothesis, it be-
comes clear that unless regulatory legislation is an indisputable neces-
sity the choice of an ideal credit rate ought to be left to free market
forces. The market can adjust to the interests of both the consumer and
the seller with greater ease than the legislature. Only in the face of
clear-cut malfunctioning of the market50 should government tamper
with interest rates.
48 The economic and social climate could be pictured differently than my previous
description. Instead of a working competition, there could be present a com-
bination between all dealers in revolving credit whose aim it is to maintain
credit charges at an artificially inflated level. The social conditions could be
such that most products sold under the credit plan would be necessities, and
most buyers no longer would have the power to refuse to purchase at high
interest rates.
49 See note 27, supra.
50 See note 48, supra.
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In concluding, legislative action of a limited nature is recommended
to overrule the Penney Case. This could be accomplished through some
type of permissive legislation that would identify the revolving charge
account and allow it to exist unencumbered.
Conclusion
In recent years, some courts have seen a need to regulate interest
charges on credit sales. They have accomplished this, for the most part,
by limiting the "time-price doctrine" so that credit sales no longer en-
joyed their historical exemption from the usury statutes. Since it is not
feasible for the seller to extend credit at the usury rate, the consequence
of this action has been a decrease in the availability of credit. In the
absence of corrective legislation, this -scarcity of credit will presumably
drive the consumer to more expensive forms of credit, with the net re-
sult being that the consumer will pay interest fees many times that
charged by the vendor.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State of Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney
Co., all but abolished the time-price doctrine as it applied to revolving
charge accounts in Wisconsin. This being so, some Wisconsin consum-
ers can anticipate being turned away from this relatively inexpensive
form of credit.5 1 This tighter credit market at a time when people are
demanding more open-end credit should, hopefully, serve to move the
law-makers to aotion. To best fit the interests of the state of Wisconsin,
it is suggested that permissive legislation be enacted which will call for
mandatory disclosure of the terms of the agreement and will permit
the revolving charge account to function subject only ,to the mandates
of the market.
RONALD WARZYN
51 Unless "realistic laws are enacted," retailers no longer will be able to extend
credit, Kenneth S. Axelson, vice president and director of Finance and Ad-
ministration at Penney's, told the New York Society of Security Analysts.
The Milwaukee Sentinel, February 5, 1971, part 2, p. 4, col. 1.
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